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The new independent states born of World War I, with their
democratic constitutions, turned out to be fragile in the face
of autocratic and totalitarian doctrines and practices. Only
Finland and Czechoslovakia managed to maintain their
democratic constitution and parliamentary institutions more or
less intact during the interwar years.1 It is therefore
understandable that, in the literature on the interwar crisis
of democracy, much attention has been paid to how well the
political systems were historically grounded, especially in
order to explain the sustainability and fragility of
democracy. The argument generally advanced is that those
countries which had been democratic for a longer time and were
marked by continuity of their political institutions were
better able to stand against totalitarian and autocratic
political forces. Robert A. Dahl, for instance, has held that
the surviving democracies of the 20th century were ‘precisely
the countries we can now call the older democracies’.2 In a
similar vein, Samuel P. Huntington pointed out that newly
1 See, e.g., G. Capoccia, Defending Democracy. Reactions to
Extremism in Interwar Europe, Baltimore, London 2005, 6-9.
2 R. A. Dahl, On Democracy, New Haven, London 2000, 157.
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introduced democracies failed in the interwar years in those
countries that ‘had adopted democratic forms just before or
after World War I, where not only democracy was new but also,
in many cases, the nation was new’.3
The distinction between old and young democracies in this kind
of study is based on an analytical definition of what makes a
regime a democracy. Such a definition usually leans on an
evaluation of social structures, continuity of political
institutions, and a gradual inclusion of social classes into
political citizenship. Some seminal studies have also
emphasised the importance of political culture and the
legitimacy of political systems. Seymour Martin Lipset, for
3 S.P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late
Twentieth Century, Norman, OK 1991, 17. For rather similar
argument, see, e.g., D. Berg-Schlosser, ‘Conditions of
Authoritarianism, Fascism and Democracy in Inter-War Europe: A
Cross-Sectional and Longitudinal Analysis’, in: International
Journal of Comparative Sociology 39 (1998) 4, 335-377, 339-
340; idem, ‘Long Waves and Conjunctures of Demoratization’,
in: C.W. Haerpfer et al. (eds.), Democratization, Oxford 2009,
41-54, 47; R. Bessel, ‘The Crisis of Modern Democracy, 1919-
45’, in: D. Potter et al. (eds.), Democratization, Cambridge
1997, 71-94, 90-92; A. Cornell / J. Møller / S.-E. Skaaning,
‘The Real Lessons of the Interwar Years’, in: Journal of
Democracy 28 (2017) 3, 14-28, 15.
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instance, maintained that a high level of legitimacy was
crucial for those countries that remained democratic in the
1930s.4 However, these studies have not paid much attention to
the ways in which the people and their political leaders
themselves expressed their view of democracy.5
This study will historicise the notions of old and young
democracy by investigating the ways in which Finland was
rhetorically forged into an old democracy. In order to do so,
we must also understand the ways in which Sweden became
understood as an old democracy. Finland had been an integrated
part of the Swedish kingdom for more than six centuries before
it became a grand duchy within the Russian empire in 1809. The
Swedish constitutional and legal tradition had been a crucial
component of political identification among the Finns who
sought to construct an autonomous status for the grand duchy.
While Finland fits in the analytical category of new
4 S.M. Lipset, ‘Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic
Development and Political Legitimacy’, in: The American
Political Science Review 53 (1959) 1, 69-105, 87-90; see also
J.J. Linz, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes. Crisis,
Breakdown, & Reequilibration, Baltimore, London 1978, 45.
5 J. Kurunmäki, ‘The Lost Language of Democracy. Anti-
rhetorical Traits in Research on Democratisation and the
Interwar Crisis of Democracy’, in: Res Publica: Revista de
filosofía política 15 (2012) 27, 121-130.
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democracies, Sweden makes a good example of an old democracy
by the same standards. Finland became an independent state in
1917, experienced a civil war in 1918, and had adopted a
republican democratic constitution in 1919, which was
challenged by the extremist right-wing Lapua Movement in the
early 1930s. The defence of democracy against the movement has
made the country a notable case in the literature on the
interwar crisis of democracy.6 Sweden is an old state with a
long constitutional tradition and a gradual democratisation of
political representation. The principle of parliamentary
government was implemented in 1917 and universal suffrage was
decided upon in 1918. Sweden is regarded as a prime example of
a country where the transnational crisis of democracy never
really had an impact as a consequence of Social Democratic
policies of reformism and compromise.7
6 R. Alapuro / E. Allardt, ‘The Lapua Movement. The Threat of
Rightist Takeover in Finland, 1930–1932’, in: J. J. Linz / A.
Stepan (eds.), The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes. Europe,
Baltimore, London 1978, 122–141; Capoccia, Defending
Democracy, 138-176.
7 See, e.g., M. Hilson, ‘Scandinavia’, in: R. Gerwarth (ed.),
Twisted Paths. Europe 1914–1954, Oxford 2007, 20-31; T.
Ertman, ‘Democracy and Dictatorship in Interwar Western Europe
Revisited’, in: World Politics, 50 (1998) 3, 475-505; S.
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In what follows, this article first discusses how Finland was
thought of as a young or a new democracy, after which it
focuses on the ways in which Finland and Sweden have been
described as old democracies. The analysis will thereafter
investigate how the age of democracy was used as an argument
in the defence of democracy in the international crisis of
democracy in the 1930s. As will be shown, the rhetoric of
‘Nordic democracy’ was a crucial part of that argument. The
analysis will be connected to Karl Loewenstein’s discussion on
the fragility of democracy, in which he pointed to the Nordic
countries as examples of the old democracies that had been
able to defend democracy in the time of crisis.
1. Finland as a young democracy
Expressions such as ‘our young democracy’ began to appear in
Finnish newspapers in 1905 after a general strike that took
place in the context of a sudden weakness of the imperial
Russian government, caused by its lost war against Japan.8 The
Berman, The Primacy of Politics. Social Democracy and the
Making of Europe’s Twentieth Century, Cambridge 2006, 152-176.
8 See, e.g., Helsingfors Posten, 19 December 1905; Wasabladet,
11 April 1907; Nya Pressen 23 May 1908. This and the following
observations are based on the search for ‘young democracy’
(nuori demokratia) and ‘new democracy’ (uusi demokratia) in
the digitalised corpus of Finnish newspapers in the Finnish
6
window of opportunity led to the 1906 parliamentary reform in
Finland, in which equal and universal suffrage was granted to
both men and women.9 When the Diet debated the bill in 1906, it
was held that a new era for Finland was beginning.10
Democracy was discussed in Finland both in Finnish and in
Swedish, as the Swedish language had been the main language of
political debate, administration and higher education until
the late 19th century, although the vast majority of the
people had Finnish as their native language.11 The difference
between languages had some important consequences for the ways




9 For the 1906 parliamentary reform, see J. Mylly,
Edustuksellisen kansanvallan läpimurto. Suomen Eduskunta 100
vuotta 1, Helsinki 2006.
10 J. Kurunmäki, ‘The Breakthrough of Universal Suffrage in
Finland, 1905–1906’, in: K. Palonen / T. Pulkkinen / J. M.
Rosales (eds.), Ashgate Research Companion to the Politics of
Democratisation in Europe: Concepts and Histories, Farnham
2008, 355–370, 364-367.
11 In 1880, ca. 15 percent of the people had Swedish as their
native language. See M. Engman, Språkfrågan.
Finlandssvenskhetens uppkomst 1812–1922, Helsingfors 2016, 33.
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demokrati and Finnish demokratia do not differ from the word
used in other major languages, the Finnish word kansanvalta
(people’s power, rule of the people) also connoted the concept
of nation, as kansa (the people, people) was also the root
word of the term kansakunta (nation). Both aspects of the
concept, the sovereign people and the national people, are
always to some extent present in the concept of democracy,12
but in the case of kansanvalta the semantic closeness of the
‘people’ and ‘nation’ made both the radical democratic (power
of the people) and the nationalist (power of the nation)
connotations of ‘democracy’ quite apparent.
The two sides of democracy were notably present in 1906 and
especially in 1917, when Finland was noted as ‘a young
democracy’ after the collapse of the tsarist regime in Russia
in March 1917.13 As Pasi Ihalainen has shown, the term
‘democracy’ was more extensively used in Finland than in
Sweden, Germany and Britain.14 All political parties referred
12 See B. Yack, ‘Popular Sovereignty and Nationalism’, in:
Political Theory 29 (2001) 4, 517-536.
13 See, e.g., Åbo Underrättelser, 14 April 1917; Uusi Suometar,
1 May 1917.
14 P. Ihalainen, The Springs of Democracy. National and
Transnational Debates on Constitutional Reform in the British,
German, Swedish and Finnish Parliaments, 1917–1919, Helsinki
2017, 278.
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to the concept, but it was interpreted in highly contradictory
ways, ranging from a proletarian view of democracy to a
conservative nationalist view of the people as an idealised
symbol of the nation.15 The already tense situation worsened
dramatically during the Russian Bolshevik revolution in
November, paving the way for the Finnish civil war in 1918.
Both sides of the war – ‘the Reds’ and ‘the Whites’ – argued
for their cause by referring to the defence of the young
democracy in Finland.16
Even the political contest over the question of whether
Finland would become a monarchy or a republic, debated in
1918/1919, was to a large extent conducted as a question of
democracy. When the monarchists lost the case as a consequence
of the collapse of the Wilhelmine regime in Germany, their
argument for a ‘monarchical democracy’ was further developed
into an argument for a politically powerful president.17 The
Bolshevik revolution in Russia and its repercussions in
15 E.g. Sosialidemokraatti, 14 July 1917; Uusi Päivä, 12 June
1917.
16 Suomen Kansanvaltuuskunnan Tiedonantaja, 23 February 1918;
Valkoinen Suomi, 20 March 1918.
17 For a monarchical democracy, see Karjala, 31 July 1918. For
monarchist views in general and the conservative adaptation to
presidential democracy, see Ihalainen, The Springs of
Democracy, 329, 500.
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Finland had made many conservatives and even some former
liberal or centrist advocates of kansanvalta critical of
democracy. The critique of democracy was particularly notable
among the principal party of the Swedish-speaking population,
the Swedish People’s Party.18
Consequently, a positive evaluation of democracy took on a
republican and agrarian character in ‘the White Republic’.19
Only the Progressive Party (Liberals) and the Agrarian Party
mentioned ‘democracy’ in their party programmes in the 1920s.20
The Social Democrats, for their part, had an urgent need to
show that they were distancing themselves from their former
leadership, which had escaped to Soviet Russia and formed the
Finnish Communist Party in Moscow. Quoting Karl Kautsky, they
took a stand in favour of parliamentary democracy and against
18 See Ihalainen, The Springs of Democracy, 485-488.
19 Ilkka, 7 January 1920. For an example of republican support
of democracy, see Turun Sanomat, 19 April 1921. For an
Agrarian view, see Karjalan Maa, 27 May 1919. For the
monarchists’ positive use of ‘new democracy’ in Finland, see
Karjala, 31 July 1918.




dictatorship.21 As one of the party’s magazines put it, ‘it was
possible to gain quite considerable victories in the workers’
class struggle through democratic means’.22 However, it was
difficult for them to convince the non-socialist side, not
least because of groups such as the Social Democratic Youth,
who in their journal criticised the use of such words as
‘democrat’ and ‘social democrat’ while claiming instead to be
‘socialists’.23
The expressions ‘new democracy’ and ‘young democracy’
sometimes appeared in Finnish newspapers as something that
demanded an adaptation, the argument being that the extant new
republic should be developed into a new democracy.24 It is also
possible to find some clearly pejorative uses of the
expression, in which reference was made to the political
situation in the Soviet Russia and its political advocates in
21 See, e.g., Työn Valta, 31 May 1918; Suomen
Sosialidemokraatti, 7 October 1918 and 28 October 1918.
22 R. Itkonen, ‘Kansanvallan vakiinnutaminen ja kunnallinen
toiminta’, in: E. J. Kotiranta (ed.), Punainen Viesti XIV.
Sos.-Dem. Kevätjulkaisu v. 1921, Turku 1921, 8–10, 8.
23 Sapiens [pseudonym], ‘Sosialisti – Sosialidemokraatti –
Demokraatti’, in: Sosialistinen Aikakauslehti 1 (1919) 1, 7-8.
24 E.g. Savon Sanomat, 12 February 1920; Turun Sanomat, 19
April 1921.
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Finland and elsewhere.25 Such terminology also had a wider
resonance outside of Finland. In the aftermath of the collapse
of authoritarian regimes at the end of the war, it was widely
held that ‘the young democracies’ needed support and guidance,
because the ‘youngsters in democracy’, as one US newspaper put
it, were fragile and experienced ‘explosive young diseases’.26
Importantly, this increased attention to the problems
experienced by ‘young democracies’ briefly made the notion of
‘old democracies’ more common than before, as old
constitutional states were re-described as democracies.27 The
USA was regarded not only as the leader of the ‘young
democracies’,28 but now also an ‘old democracy’ together with
countries such as Britain, France and Italy.29 Hjalmar
Branting, the leader of the Swedish Social Democrats and a
25 E.g., Uusi Suomi, 31 July 1921; Vaasa, 5 April 1927.
26 The Saturday Evening Post 191 (1919) 28.
27 This observation is based on a search of the English
language dataset at the Google Books, see
https://books.google.com/ngrams/graph (accessed 5 January
2018).
28 The Literary Digest 51 (1915), 1343.
29 See, e.g., Harvard Alumni Bulletin 21 (1918–1919), 325; The
Delta of Sigma Nu fraternity 36 (1919), 182. For Finnish
notions of USA as the guide and support for young democracies,
see Uusi Päivä, 13 December 1918; Aamulehti, 14 December 1918.
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prominent advocate of the League of Nations, envisaged a
peacetime Europe as the Europe of ‘old democracy and
socialism’.30 Finnish Foreign Minister Rudolf Holsti (Liberals)
for his part maintained that revolutionary ideas had emerged
especially in those countries where conservatism had ruled,
whereas the workers had shown a more mature and reformist
stand in the old democratic states. In such a categorisation,
Finland belonged, obviously, to the former group.31
The use of the term ‘young democracies’ became less common
towards the end of the 1920s.32 Although it might have been
thought that this was because young democracies had grown
older, it is more important to view the decline of the term as
a sign of a general critique of democracy.33 In 1923, a
30 Hufvustadsbladet, 14 January 1920.
31 Helsingin Sanomat, 8 February 1920; Dagens Press, 9 February
1920.
32 This observation is based on a search of the archive of
Finnish newspapers at the Finnish National Library at
https://digi.kansalliskirjasto.fi/sanomalehti/ (accessed 14
January 2018) as well as of the English language corpus at
Google Books at https://books.google.com/ngrams/graph
(accessed 5 January 2018).
33 See, e.g., M. Mazower, Dark Continent. Europe’s Twentieth
Century, London 1998, 8-39; F. Stern, ‘The New Democracies in
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conservative Finnish newspaper pointed out the fragility of
young democracies because of the increased appeal that
dictatorship had in these countries. According to the paper,
this was especially the case in Germany, where the war had
raised democracy to power, even though ‘there were no
democrats’ in the country.34 Another conservative paper noted a
couple of years later that respect for democratic institutions
was higher in old democracies than in young ones. This message
was directed to the Finnish Social Democrats who, according to
the columnist, had been criticising parliamentary institutions
in a manner that undermined their legitimacy.35
However, it was more common in conservative argumentation to
criticise parliamentary democracy than to defend it.36 The
historian Jaakko Forsman, for instance, held that modern
democracy was an ideology which in practice did not mean the
power of the people, but, instead, the power of party leaders
Crisis in Interwar Europe’, in: A. Hadenius (ed.), Democracy’s
Victory and Crisis, Cambridge 1997, 15-23.
34 Karjala, 4 October 1923.
35 Satakunnan Kansa, 15 July 1925.
36 See also A. Elmgren, ‘Medborgerliga rättigheter? De
intellektuella och 1930-talets statsmakt’, in: H. Meinander /
P. Karonen / K. Östberg (eds.), Demokratins drivkrafter.
Kontext och särdrag i Finlands och Sveriges demokratier 1890–
2020, Helsingfors, Stockholm 2018, 225-256, 226.
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who demagogically spoke in the name of the people. Quoting
authorities such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Gustave Le Bon,
and clearly drawing on Robert Michels and Carl Schmitt, he
argued that the people could not be democratically
represented. He also explained that it would have been easier
for the Finns if they had used the Greek word demokratia
instead of the Finnish word kansanvalta, because the foreign
word would not have rendered so visible the contradiction that
was built into the concept.37 While one conservative paper saw
Forsman’s article as ‘a critique of the modern way of life’,38
the leading liberal paper criticised its monolithic view of
the people and held that a vibrant civil society with its
meetings and free press were proof of the opposite.39
There were two cleavages in Finnish political culture that
kept the language of democracy somewhat central to political
debates: the division of the civil war, which fuelled the
dichotomy between democracy and communism; and the controversy
between Finnish-language nationalists and the advocates of
Swedish nationality in Finland, which made ‘Finnish democracy’
a label that was deployed on both sides of the language
strife. It is striking that the Swedish-language press in
37 J. Forsman, ‘Ideologia ja politiikka’, Valvoja-Aika (1926)
7-8, 249-260, 250, 255-256.
38 Laatokka, 9 September 1926.
39 Helsingin Sanomat, 3 October 1926.
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Finland seems not to have had any positive description of
finsk demokrati in the 1920s.40 Their critique of Finnish
democracy was based not only on the conservatism of the
leading advocates of the Swedish Party, but also on their view
of the nature of Finnish-language culture. As one author put
it, Swedish culture in Finland was the bearer of an eight-
hundred-year-old German political system that had fought
against Russian unfreedom and violence, which he then set
against ‘the contemporary Finns’ demands for levelling and the
power of the masses’.41 It was also claimed that Finns were not
able to support a civilised culture and that democracy was a
proof of it,42 along with denunciations that ‘democracy exists
only for the Finns, but not for the Swedish part of our
people’.43 Such rhetoric notwithstanding, it should
nevertheless be noted that there were some notable leftist
40 This observation is based on the search for ‘Finnish
democracy’ in Swedish (finsk demokrati) in the 1920s in the




41 E. Schybergson, ‘1920’, in: Hälsning till sydvästra Finlands
svenska allmoge, Åbo 1920, 3-4, 4.
42 Vasabladet, 10 September 1922.
43 Vasabladet, 1 August 1923.
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intellectuals who belonged to the Swedish People’s Party.
Moreover, the party co-operated on several occasions with the
Social Democrats, who had in general an open-minded view of
the language issue.44
The language issue also dominated Finnish-language references
to ‘Finnish democracy’. In the rhetoric of the Agrarian Party,
it was common to contrast suomalainen kansanvalta with the
notion of the Swedish-speaking reactionary upper class. The
party’s nationalist-democratic rhetoric was often directed at
the Social Democrats and the Communists, but it is noteworthy
that the most vocal rhetoric of ‘Finnish democracy’ in Finnish
was directed against the manifestations of ‘Swedishness’ in
Finland.45 Close to the Agrarian Party, but nevertheless a
cross-party language nationalist movement, the Pure-Finnish
(aitosuomalainen) movement was significant in its attack on
Swedish elitism in Finland, which was taken to oppose the
democratic nature of Finnishness.46 In the rhetoric of the
leading Pure-Finnish ideologists, Finnishness was the same as
44 See, H. Meinander, Nationalstaten. Finlands svenskhet 1922–
2015, Helsingfors 2016, 21-23.
45 Ilkka, 10 March 1926. See also A. Elmgren, Den allrakäraste
fienden. Svenska stereotypier i finländsk press 1918–1939,
Lund 2008, 68.
46 E.g. Suomi, 22 October 1925; S. Kirri, ‘Pakina Helsingistä’,
in: Aitosuomalainen 4 (1927) 50, 908-909.
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being democratic.47 In this way, the language nationalists on
both the Finnish and Swedish sides of the linguistic dispute
seemed to agree on the essentially democratic nature of the
Finns. Moreover, the Finnish language nationalist rhetoric was
not limited to attacking the advocates of Swedish language in
Finland, but often also Sweden and Scandinavia.48
2. A Democratic tradition in Sweden and in Finland
While the young Finnish democracy was in many regards anti-
Swedish in character, the notions of an old democracy in
Finland were to a large extent based on Sweden. In Sweden, the
idea that there was an ancient age of democracy in Sweden,
Scandinavia or Norden – the words were often used
interchangeably – had appeared in the debates on noble
privileges in the late 1760s (thus including most of the area
that came to be Finland) and was established during the early
19th century, as the Viking-age peasant freedom and equal
participation in local ting-assemblies was cherished in
romantic literature and historiography. In the works of the
47 For the most explicit statement, see E. A. Aaltio,
‘Suomalainen kansanvalta’, in: Aitosuomalainen 4 (1927) 31-32,
563-567.
48 See, e.g., [anon.] ‘Herra Erik Hornborgin katsaus’, in:
Aitosuomalainen 4 (1927) 27, 495-499, 498; Aitosuomalainen, 23
March 1929.
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historian Erik Gustaf Geijer, it was an anti-aristocratic idea
at the same time as it was a monarchical one, emphasising a
harmonious relationship between the peasants and their king.49
The notion was used as an argument in Swedish mid-19th-century
political debates on the reform of estate-based political
representation. It was employed both in favour of political
reforms and against democratisation, as it was possible to
maintain that the principles of the democratic past should be
restored in a modern form, but it was also possible to claim
that the existing tradition made further demands futile or
even hazardous.50
In Finland, the notion of an ancient free peasantry and the
coalition between the king and the peasants was discussed in a
study of Swedish constitutional history by J.J. Nordström in
1839/1840. The topic was popularised by the famous journalist,
49 See, in particular, E. G. Geijer, ‘Feodalism och
republikanism’, in: Samlade skrifter II, Stockholm 1874 [1818–
1819], 270-379, 282. For an analysis, see J. Kurunmäki / I.
Herrmann, ‘Birthplaces of Democracy: The Rhetoric of
Democratic Tradition in Switzerland and Sweden’, in: J.
Kurunmäki / J. Nevers / H. te Velde (eds.), Democracy in
Modern Europe: A Conceptual History, New York, Oxford 2018,
88-112, 95-98.
50 See, e.g., Aftonbladet, 7 December 1843; Svenska Tidningen,
18 October 1852.
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novelist, and history professor Zachris Topelius from the
1850s on.51 Both men were writing in the European intellectual
context of the Romantic and Hegelian thinkers, and they were
aware of the works of Geijer and his Swedish contemporaries,
as they belonged to a Swedish intellectual sphere both in
terms of learning and reputation. Unlike in Sweden, however,
Finnish notions of the age of freedom were not turned to the
rhetoric of democracy in the 19th century, but were
increasingly interpreted as being focused on Finnish early
medieval history in particular, rather than as part of a wider
Swedish or Nordic heritage.52
The idea of the democratic past was used in both countries as
a reformist rhetorical device when demands for parliamentary
democratisation increased at the beginning of the 20th
51 See M. Klinge, A History both Finnish and European. History
and Culture of Historical Writing in Finland during the
Imperial Period, Helsinki 2012, 84-91, 153-158, 186-193; M.
Vuorinen, ‘Herrat, hurrit ja ryssän kätyrit – suomalaisuuden
vastakuvia’, in: J. Pakkasvirta / P. Saukkonen (eds.),
Nationalismit, Helsinki 2004, 246-264, 250-251.
52 See D. Fewster, ‘‘Braves Step Out of the Night of the
Barrows’. Regenerating the Heritage of Early Medieval
Finland’, in: R. Evans / G. P. Marchal (eds.), The Uses of the
Middle Ages in Modern European States. History, Nationhood and
the Search for Origins, Basingstoke 2011, 31-51.
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century. In Sweden, the Liberals and the Social Democrats
employed the idea of ancient democracy in their struggle for
the parliamentarisation of the government and the
democratisation of suffrage in the 1910s. In keeping with
their critique of the bourgeois nature of the existing canon
of Swedish history, the Social Democrats drew on the same
historical symbols, but gave them their own reading.53 As Pasi
Ihalainen has shown, many Social Democratic MPs referred to an
ancient democratic tradition during parliamentary debates.54
The Liberals sought to historicise their demand for
parliamentary government, which in some cases led to
interpretations that drew on the idea of ancient democracy.
This view gained support from the political scientist Fredrik
Lagerroth, according to whom contemporary demands for
parliamentarism were based on the oldest known organisation of
53 Å. Linderborg, Socialdemokraterna skriver historia:
Historieskrivning som ideologisk maktresurs, Stockholm 2001,
273, 298-93.
54 P. Ihalainen, ‘The 18th-century Traditions of Representation
in a New Age of Revolution’, in: Scandinavian Journal of
History 40 (2015) 1, 70-96, 73; Ihalainen, The Springs of
Democracy, 161, 171
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Swedish society, which was ‘decisively democratic’.55 As the
struggle over parliamentarism was directed primarily against
the existing powers of the monarch, the leftist rhetoric of
ancient democracy no longer emphasised the idea of the
coalition between the monarch and the people.
In Finland, the Finnish-language nationalist spirit that
characterised political life, whether in its conservative,
liberal or socialist form, gave the Finnish trope of an
ancient democracy a more diversified character than merely
leftist. However, the socialists’ rhetoric was in many regards
similar to that in Sweden, as they viewed the Finnish
tradition as belonging to the Swedish tradition, which was
taken to have been originally democratic. The Nordic
democratic past was used as an argument against the dual
authority of the monarch and the parliament by Yrjö Sirola,
the MP who came to be one of the leaders of ‘the Reds’, when
in 1907 he claimed that ‘in the times of the original Nordic
democracy, the people had the right to elect and expel the
king’.56 Likewise, some Social Democratic MPs held in 1917 that
the Swedish tradition was originally democratic, but that the
class interests of the Nobles, the Clergy and the bourgeoisie
55 F. Lagerroth, Frihetstidens författning. En studie i den
svenska konstitutionalismens historia, Stockholm, 1915, 5-6,
280-81, 322, 385.
56 Eteenpäin, 5 October 1907.
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had put an end to it. This socialist argument was also
developed into a Finnish nationalist interpretation, according
to which the original Nordic democracy had existed in Finland
before the country had come under Swedish rule. Importantly,
there was also a non-socialist, mainly Agrarian, notion of a
long tradition of the representation of free peasants, which
was used as an argument in favour of democracy. For them, the
language-nationalist popular movement was the bearer of that
tradition.57
Notwithstanding this kind of rhetoric, neither Sweden nor
Finland was commonly regarded as an old democracy in the
1920s. In Sweden, the Social Democrats argued for further
democratisation in the name of ‘industrial democracy’ and
‘economic democracy’.58 The Liberals had lost much of the
initiative, but were trying to compete with the idea of ‘an
enlightened democracy’ in their electoral manifesto.59 The
57 Ihalainen, ‘The 18th-century Traditions’, 77-79, 84, 87;
Ihalainen, The Springs of Democracy, 327; A.J. Alanen, Santeri
Alkio, Porvoo 1976, 435.
58 See A. Friberg, Demokrati bortom politiken. En
begreppshistorisk analys av demokratibegreppet inom Sveriges
socialdemokratiska arbetareparti 1919–1939, Stockholm 2012,
87-148.
59 The archive of the Swedish party programmes and manifestos
at http://snd.gu.se/sv/vivill/party/ (accessed 7 March 2017).
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conservative parties preferred expressions such as ‘ancient
liberty’, ‘self-government’ and ‘popular rule’ instead of
‘democracy’.60 In the memoirs of the former US Ambassador to
Sweden, Sweden was described both as a democratic and an
aristocratic country, which had preserved its noble character
even after democratisation, unlike many other countries that
adhered to ‘democratism’. The Swedish democracy was thus
viewed as young and yet different from other new democracies
because it was based, as it was held, on ‘intellect’s
aristocracy’ and ‘an indifference between a nobleman and a
peasant’.61
The rhetoric of an old democratic tradition in Finland served
purposes that were absent in Sweden. On the one hand, the
civil-war background made it rhetorically appealing to use the
idea of an old democratic past as an argument against current
left-wing protests by claiming, as one conservative paper put
it, that freedom, brotherhood, and equality had already been
granted ‘in our Nordic and original democratic society’.62 The
conservative paper thus followed a pattern that had been
established in Swedish conservative rhetoric in the 19th
60 See R. Torstendahl, Mellan nykonservatism och liberalism.
Idébrytningar inom högern och bondepartierna 1918-1934,
Stockholm 1969, 103.
61 Svenska Dagbladet, 24 May 1923.
62 Iltalehti, 3 May 1924.
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century, when the trope of ancient Swedish democracy was used
against political reforms. On the other hand, the idea of an
old democratic past was used against the advocates of
Swedishness in Finland. The argument was that Finland had
originally formed part of the ancient democratic Nordic
culture, but it had been destroyed by the Swedish colonialism
in Finland. This pure-Finnish strand was based on the idea
that ‘Finnishness and democracy had almost always belonged
together’, as one of their main ideologists put it.63
3. The fragility of democracy: from the crisis to Nordic
democracy
By the mid-1930s, a great deal of the negative attitudes
towards Sweden in Finnish politics had relaxed, although the
language issue was still a divisive political subject.
However, it had taken a challenge to democracy in Finland, the
rise to power of the Nazis in Germany, and the subsequent
dissolution of the international order for this to happen. The
change resulted in ‘the Scandinavian orientation’ of Finnish
foreign policy, announced in 1935 and motivated by security
63 E. A. Aaltio, ‘Suomalainen kansanvalta’, in: Aitosuomalainen
4 (1927) 31-32, 563-567, 563. See also Helsingin Lehti, 18
August 1927; Maakansa, 19 August 1927.
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concerns.64 The rapprochement had consequences with regard to
how democracy was evaluated in Finland. For instance, the
Finnish Conservative Party, which had previously been critical
of democracy, linked the defence of ‘the democratic and
parliamentary constitution’ with ‘the inherited Nordic values
and freedom’ in its 1936 electoral manifesto.65 Likewise, the
Swedish People’s Party welcomed the Scandinavian orientation
by maintaining that ‘the political system was based on the
democratic ground in all these countries’.66
The Finnish crisis of democracy, in the form of the right-wing
extremist Lapua Movement between 1929 and 1932, was in many
ways similar to the attacks against democratic systems that
were taking place in many other countries. Finnish newspapers
usually compared it with Fascism in Italy, but references were
64 See L. Kaukiainen, ‘From Reluctancy to Activity. Finland’s
Way to the Nordic Family during 1920s and 1930s’, in:
Scandinavian Journal of History 9 (1984) 2, 201–219; J.
Kurunmäki, ‘‘Nordic Democracy’ in 1935. On the Finnish and
Swedish Rhetoric of Democracy’, in: J. Kurunmäki / J. Strang
(eds.), Rhetorics of Nordic Democracy, Helsinki 2010, 37–82,
52–65.
65 The archive of Finnish party programmes and manifestos at
http://www.fsd.uta.fi/pohtiva/ohjelmalistat/ (accessed 30
November 2017).
66 Valtiopäivät 1935. Pöytäkirjat III, Helsinki 1936, 2518.
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also made to the National Socialists in Germany.67 Especially
in its early phase, the movement had support from a wide range
of non-leftist circles, including many industrialists and
military officers as well as members of the non-socialist
parties. The movement managed to have the political activities
of the Communists banned. There were also plans to transform
parliament into a corporatist chamber based on the
representation of economic interests and to increase the power
of the president. As the methods of the movement became
increasingly violent, many centrist supporters distanced
themselves from it. The movement was banned in 1932 after some
of its leaders had demanded the resignation of the government
by deploying armed men. At this stage, President Svinhufvud, a
Conservative who had gained his position thanks to the Lapua
Movement, stood against the leaders of the revolt and
successfully upheld the rule of law in the country. The newly
enacted ‘communist laws’ were used against the Lapua Movement
itself;68 and, after the dissolution of the movement, right-
67 See R. Perälä, Lapuan liike ja sanan mahti, Rovaniemi 1998,
417.
68 See Capoccia, Defending Democracy, 6-9, 41-46; Alapuro /
Alllardt, ‘The Lapua Movement’, 122-141; J. Siltala,
Lapuanliike ja kyyditykset 1930, Helsinki 1985; M. Uola,
‘Parlamentaarisen demokratian haastajat 1920- ja 1930-
luvuilla’, in: V. Vares / M. Uola / M. Majander (eds.),
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wing extremism found a new voice through the People’s
Patriotic Movement, which was based in the Conservative Party
before it was thrown out of the party in 1934.69
The leaders of the Lapua movement claimed that they were
defending democracy against Communism.70 This was a commonly-
held view: for example the leading Conservative paper held in
1929 that a temporary dictatorship could be needed in order to
find ‘strong personalities’ and to guarantee the survival of
democracy.71 Indeed, so widespread was the anti-Communist
sentiment in the country that the Social Democrats’ leader,
Väinö Tanner, initially explained the emergence of the Lapua
Movement as a reaction against the ‘senseless and childish
action of the Communists’.72 It was, nevertheless, more common
Kansanvalta koetuksella. Suomen Eduskunta 100 vuotta 3,
Helsinki 2006, 190-246.
69 See Uola, ‘Parlamentaarisen demokratian haastajat’, 213-214,
250-254; V. Vares, ‘Kokoomus ja demokratian kriisi’, in: V.
Vares / A. Uino, Suomalaiskansallinen Kokoomus. Kansallisen
Kokoomuspuolueen historia 1929–1944, Helsinki 2007, 35-37,
106-107, 118-119.
70 See V. Vares, ‘Kokoomus ja demokratian kriisi’, 20; Siltala,
Lapuanliike ja kyyditykset 1930, 451-452.
71 Uusi Suomi, 10 March 1929.
72 V. Tanner, Itsenäisen Suomen arkea. Valikoima puheita,
Helsinki 1956 [1930], 309-310.
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among the Social Democrats to maintain that the government was
ignoring the danger that the fascists were causing.73 The
liberal press, in turn, viewed the movement as a threat to
democracy and parliamentarism.74 In Sweden, conservative
opinion tended to adopt an understanding view of the
movement’s anti-Communism, but the Social Democrats saw it as
an alarming attack on democracy and no different in its basic
character from fascist movements elsewhere in Europe.75 In a
similar spirit, the leading liberal newspaper in Sweden used
the expression ‘half-fascist’ when commenting on Finland
during the Lapua Movement.76
The successful defence against the Lapua Movement did not by
itself lead to a widely held opinion that Finland was an old
democracy. A more important influence were the political
developments in Germany. Although the Nazi takeover had gained
some support both in Finland and in Sweden, as it was thought
that it would defeat Communism and re-install a conservative
regime, Nazi-sympathetic factions were expelled from the
Conservative party in both countries in 1934 with the
73 Suomen Sosialidemokraatti, 1 December 1929.
74 Helsingin Sanomat, 3 January 1930.
75 See H. Tingsten, The Debate on the Foreign Policy of Sweden,
London 1949, 140, 149, 224; E. Lönnroth, Den svenska
utrikespolitikens historia. V 1919–1939, Stockholm 1959, 129.
76 Dagens Nyheter, 6 August 1930.
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justification that fascism and Nazism were not national but
foreign doctrines.77 This emphasis on the national political
culture led to a more general acceptance of democracy among
the Conservatives; and in this regard the rhetoric of Nordic
democracy came to play a crucial role.
The Swedish political scientist Herbert Tingsten pointed out
in his 1933 monograph on the breakthrough and subsequent
crisis of democracy that the countries in which democratic
methods had been applied for a longer period of time seemed to
be able to defend democracy.78 A similar point was made in a
major liberal Swedish newspaper in 1933, when it was held that
democracy was in crisis, especially in countries where it had
not had time to become rooted, such as Russia, Italy and
Germany.79 Later in the same year, a Swedish Social Democratic
MP argued that the course of events in Germany did not reveal
much about democracy’s capacities, because ‘democracy had been
out-manoeuvred in countries where it had never played a long-
standing role’ and that democracy had been tried in countries
77 See Torstendahl, Mellan nykonservatism och liberalism, 97,
103; Vares, ‘Kokoomus ja demokratian kriisi’, 16, 168-170,
201.
78 H. Tingsten, Demokratiens seger och kris. Vår egen tids
historia 1880–1930. Den författningspolitiska utvecklingen
1880–1930, Stockholm 1933, 20, 32.
79 Dagens Nyheter, 30 July 1933.
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that did not have any democratic tradition. What was taking
place, he explained, was that democracy had been pushed back
to ‘the oases where it had existed before: France, Belgium,
Holland, Switzerland, England and the Nordic countries’.80
While discussing the methods that a democracy was able to use
against its internal enemies, he noted that the risk that the
great majority of the people in the Nordic countries would
turn against democracy was very marginal, as they had
experienced the growth of popular self-government ‘over
centuries’. ‘Even the Finnish people’, he held, ‘have recently
shown an unexpected firmness in this matter’.81
The rhetoric of Nordic democracy was based on the idea of a
Nordic value community. The Swedish Prime Minister P.A.
Hansson (Social Democrats) drew on references to a specific
‘Nordic temperament’, as he drew a contrast between young
democracies and the Nordic countries;82 and the Finnish Prime
Minister T. Kivimäki (Liberals) pointed to ‘a similar world
view’ between Finland and the Scandinavian countries when he
announced the Finnish foreign-policy orientation towards
Scandinavia in 1935.83 Although viewed as being exceptional,
80 N. Andersson, ‘Är demokratin i fara i de demokratiska
länderna?’, in: Tiden 25 (1933), 484-488, 484.
81 Ibid., 488.
82 Dagens Nyheter, 2 January 1935.
83 Valtiopäivät 1935. Pöytäkirjat III, Helsinki 1936, 2514.
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the Nordic value community was also often presented as a sign
of a Western civilization. In Finland, this coupling of the
Western and the Nordic values was used to criticise the
Italian and German influences in Finland when the editor of a
left-wing cultural weekly, Erkki Vala, demanded a Western
cultural and political orientation in Finland in the name of
the tradition of Nordic democracy. For Vala, the Nordic and
Anglo-Saxon countries were the guardians of Western
civilisation in the time of crisis.84 The association between
Nordic and Western values also supported the idea that there
was a family of countries that were old democracies.
The Nordic Social Democratic parties made the notion of a
specific Nordic democracy their own brand in 1935. This was
demonstrated through ‘The Day of the Nordic Democracy’, a mass
meeting organised against the fascist, Nazi and Bolshevik
totalitarian doctrines. Besides the re-statement of long-
standing Social Democratic political preferences such as those
for social security and economic equality, and on some
occasions socialism, this notion of an inherited democratic
tradition was a crucial aspect of the branding of ‘Nordic
84 Tulenkantajat, No. 3, 3 January 1933, and No. 5, 4 February
1933. See also Elmgren, Den allrakäraste fienden, 53-55, 103-
139.
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democracy’.85 According to the Finnish party leader Tanner, the
peasant and the worker had always been free in the Nordic
countries, whereas in the new democracies the ideas of freedom
had not had time to become rooted and create a tradition
strong enough to make democracy stable.86 Later in the same
year at the meeting of the Nordic Social Democrats, he
maintained that all the Nordic countries shared a strong
tradition of democracy, which separated them from most of the
other European countries.87 Significantly, he did not regard
Finland as a new democracy, but an old Nordic one.
The Conservatives viewed the Social Democrats’ rhetoric of
Nordic democracy as a party-political manoeuvre. For instance,
one Swedish conservative paper claimed that the Social
Democrats’ appeal to democracy was ‘empty and hollow’.88 The
Conservative Party’s daily in Finland held not only that ‘the
demonstration in Malmö was a brutal misuse of the word
democracy for the purpose of party propaganda’, but also that
the socialism that was propagated aimed at ‘the destruction of
Nordic democracy and its ancient ideals of freedom’.89 However,
85 Fyra tal om nordisk demokrati, Stockholm 1935. For an
analysis, see Kurunmäki, ‘‘Nordic Democracy’ in 1935’, 37-43.
86 Ibid., 13, 19.
87 Suomen Sosialidemokraatti, 9 December 1935.
88 Sydsvenska Dagbladet, 26 August 1935.
89 Uusi Suomi, 29 August 1935.
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the non-socialists of different stripes found it difficult to
reject the Social Democratic rhetoric of Nordic democracy, as
the idea of a democratic tradition belonged in one form or
another even to their view of what counted as a national
tradition, as the rhetoric deployed by the Finnish
conservative paper shows. In Sweden, the foremost Conservative
advocate of the idea of an old Nordic tradition of democracy
was Nils Herlitz, a Professor of Public Law, according to whom
the consequences of the crisis of democracy did not need to be
the same in the Nordic countries as in countries such as
Portugal, Italy and Greece. In the Nordic countries, he held,
individual freedom was respected and people had the principle
of equality ‘in their blood’, as they were the inheritors of
an ancient culture of rights and rule of law.90 In Finland, the
prominent Conservative Paavo Virkkunen had argued, as early as
1927, that parliamentarism was democracy’s highest form in
order to dismiss the claims of dictatorial and anti-
parliamentarian doctrines. This unusual conservative defence
of parliamentarism was based on the conviction that
parliamentarism had the best chance to develop in countries
90 N. Herliz, Svensk självstyre, Stockholm 1933, 277-279.
Herlitz presented his view of the democratic tradition and its
contemporary virtues to an international audience in his pre-
war volume Sweden. A Modern Democracy on Ancient Foundations,
Minneapolis 1939.
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that had an ancient tradition of popular freedom, which
included the Lutheran Nordic countries.91 Moreover, one of the
most vocal intellectuals of the Pure-Finnish faction, the
upcoming Agrarian politician Urho Kekkonen, who in his booklet
Demokratian itsepuolustus (The Self-Defence of Democracy)
(1934) had held that too much freedom was dangerous for
democracy and that democracy needed to be able to fight also
against its internal enemies,92 maintained that political and
societal life in the Nordic countries had for centuries been
based on democratic grounds.93
The celebration of the 500th anniversary of the Swedish
parliament in 1935 provided an opportunity for Finnish
politicians to emphasise the historical rootedness of
democracy in a manner that transcended party allegiances.
While PM Hansson held that ‘the Swedish people had been able
to maintain their ancient self-government’,94 the Finnish
delegation that was invited to the commemoration were able to
91 P. Virkkunen, ‘Parlamentarismin pula nykyaikana. Suomen
valtiollisen elämän kannalta’, in: Valvoja-aika (1927), 287-
313, 292, 298, 307.
92 U. Kekkonen, ‘Demokratian itsepuolustus’, in: U. Kekkonen,
Puheita ja kirjoituksia IV, Helsinki 1973 [1934], 29-110.
93 Suomalainen Suomi (1935) 5, 236-239.
94 K. Hildebrand and E. Hallin (eds.), Riksdagens minnesfest
1935, Stockholm 1936, 68.
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underline Finland’s adherence to the community of democratic
Nordic countries by referring to the historical fact that
political representation in Finland had been part of the old
Swedish tradition. As such rhetoric indicates, it was thought
possible to claim that there was a long constitutional
tradition on which the present democracy was built. In the
address congratulating the Swedish Riksdag, the Finnish
parliament referred to ‘the freedom and the spirit of
togetherness in the Nordic democracies’ when it maintained
that these countries were strong enough to stand against the
undemocratic changes of political representation that in many
countries had destroyed the freedom of their citizens.95
The notion of Finland as an old democracy gained some
international recognition in Karl Loewenstein’s 1935 analysis
of a Europe divided between autocracy and democracy.96 The
German legal scholar, who had emigrated to the USA two years
earlier, and who would become known for his account of
95 Ibid., 132.
96 K. Loewenstein, ‘Autocracy versus Democracy in Contemporary
Europe, I’, in: The American Political Science Review 29
(1935) 4, 571-593; idem., ‘Autocracy versus Democracy in
Contemporary Europe, II’, in: The American Political Science
Review 29 (1935) 5, 755-784.
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‘militant democracy’ two years later,97 held up the
Scandinavian countries as important examples of traditionally
democratic countries that had been strong enough to stand
against autocracy and dictatorship. Out of the countries that
still had parliamentary rule intact, only Czechoslovakia did
not own a democratic tradition.98 He held that ‘[i]n none of
the countries now under a dictatorship has the tradition of
self-government and of free institutions been sufficiently
strong and lasting to avert the recurrence of autocratic rule,
which, for an immemorial period, has been the customary form
of national government’.99
In his account, Finland was included among the Scandinavian
countries, yet it was still a special case. According to
Loewenstein, the dangers facing the democratic system had been
greater in Finland than in the other Scandinavian countries.
97 K. Loewenstein, ‘Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights,
I’, in: The American Political Science Review 31 (1937) 3,
417-432; idem., ‘Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights,
II’, in: The American Political Science Review 31 (1937) 4,
638-658.
98 Loewenstein, ‘Autocracy versus Democracy in Contemporary
Europe, I’, 571, 588.
99 Ibid., 586–587.
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For him, Finland was on ‘a middle course’.100 Anticipating his
subsequent development of the concept of militant democracy,
he maintained that the restrictions that had been imposed on
the Communists and the Lapua Movement in Finland were a good
example of a country in which extremists from the left and the
right were met with the strong resistance of the middle
classes.101
4. Concluding remarks
This study has focused on the language of democracy in Finland
and Sweden, but it may also allow for some general
observations. First, the rhetoric of the youth and age of
democracy should be understood as one way of contesting the
meaning of democracy. Analysing this rhetoric may help us to
understand the complexity of what was understood as democracy
and the crisis thereof.102 Second, the ways in which certain
100 Loewenstein, ‘Autocracy versus Democracy in Contemporary
Europe, II’, 763.
101 Ibid.
102 For the contested concepts of democracy and crisis, see J.
Gijsenbergh, ‘Crisis of Democracy or Creative Reform? Dutch
Debates on the Repression and Parliamentary Representatives
and Political Parties, 1933–1940’, in: J. Gijsenbergh et al.
(eds.), Creative Crises of Democracy, Brussels 2012, 237-268;
M. Llanque, ‘The Edges of Democracy: German, British and
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political regimes were grouped together as survivors in the
time of the crisis of democracy should not be understood
merely as a result of an analysis of the contemporary
situation, but also as a rhetorical means of defending
democracy by emphasising its solid anchorage in the people and
in the national tradition. The distinction between old and new
democracies had an important role in this defence of
democracy. In this regard, the rhetoric of Nordic democracy
was in many ways similar to the wartime rhetoric of ‘Western
democracy’ as promoted by British historians and politicians,
anticipating the Wilsonian 1917 claim of making the world safe
for democracy.103 In both cases, many former opponents of
democracy turned into democrats when they felt that their
political system was threatened.
Third, the interwar defence of democracy made democracy in the
more or less stable nation-states older than what any critical
analysis of the historical formation of political institutions
and previously used political language would suggest. We
American Debates on the Dictatorial Challenges to Democracy in
the Interwar Years’, in: Kurunmäki / Nevers / te Velde (eds.),
Democracy in Modern Europe, 182-207.
103 See M. Llanque, ‘The First World War and the Invention of
‘Western Democracy’’, in: R. Bavaj / M. Steber (eds.), Germany
and ‘the West’. The History of a Modern Concept, New York
2015, 69–80.
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should therefore understand assertions of the age of democracy
as a result of a process whereby current political purposes
motivated a rhetorical re-description of the past, to use
Quentin Skinner’s terminology.104 It is obvious that Finnish
and Swedish political actors were not exceptional in this
regard. For instance, Francis Dupuis-Déri has shown that the
explicitly anti-democratic ‘founding fathers’ of the Canadian
modern constitution in the 1860s were reinterpreted as the
creators of the Canadian democracy during the World War and
the interwar period.105 One consequence of the retroactive
invention of historical roots of democracy was that the
‘breakthrough’ of democracy in the form of the introduction of
universal suffrage, and especially the role of women’s
suffrage, was made relatively insignificant as a historical
landmark when the democracy that was to be defended was
presented as an old democracy.106
104 See Q. Skinner, Visions of Politics. Volume I: Regarding
Method, Cambridge 2002, 179.
105 F. Dupuis-Déri, ‘History of the Word ‘Democracy’ in Canada
and Québec: A Political Analysis of Rhetorical Strategies’,
in: World Political Science Review 6 (2010) 1, 1-23.
106 See J. Kurunmäki, ‘How Women’s Suffrage Was Devaluated: The
Burden of Analytical Categories and the Conceptual History of
Democracy’, in: K. Palonen / J. M. Rosales (eds.),
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Finally, this study suggests that the historical existence of
certain political institutions is important for the formation
of ‘an old democracy’, as was correctly pointed out in the
post-war research literature on democratisation; but it
mattered less in terms of an actual continuity of pre-
democratic political institutions than as a source for a
tradition of political rhetoric. A defence of democracy is
likely to be more successful when there is a widely enough
held opinion that democracy is a part of the national
political culture.107 The sustainability and fragility of
interwar democracy was concerned to a large extent with the
question of how ‘national’ democracy was, and how this
national character of democracy fitted into the framework of
existing democratic institutions. In the case of Finland and
Sweden, the geopolitical and ideological situation in Europe
made most non-socialists take the side of existing political
institutions instead of the anti-democratic doctrines that had
been defined as anti-national. The leading Social Democrats,
in turn, downplayed their internationalism and their initially
reluctant attitude towards ‘bourgeois democracy’ in order to
emphasise instead the national characteristics of democracy.
Parliamentarism and Democratic Theory: Historical and
Contemporary Perspectives, Opladen et al. 2015, 31-52.
107 See also Loewenstein, ‘Autocracy versus Democracy in
Contemporary Europe, I’, 587.
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Abstract
Democracy both Young and Old: Finland and Sweden and the
Interwar Crisis of Democracy
It is often pointed out in the literature of democratisation
and the breakdown of democracy that old democracies have been
able to stand against the threat of totalitarian and extremist
political doctrines better than young ones. This observation
has usually been based on the existence of solid political
institutions, certain class structures and the legitimacy of a
political system. The focus of this article is on the
rhetorical role that the division between ‘old’ and ‘young’ or
‘new’ democracies played during the interwar crisis of
democracy. By focusing on the cases of Finland and Sweden,
which have been described as a young democracy and an old
democracy respectively in the literature on democratisation,
the study directs attention to the ways in which the age of
democracy has been produced in order to defend democratic
institutions against totalitarian doctrines and practices. The
article thus contributes to the conceptual history of
democracy and helps explaining why Finland managed to maintain
its democratic political institutions as one of the few new
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